PETITION OF MA AGAINST THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT [2017] ScotCS CSOH

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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> PETITION OF MA AGAINST THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT [2017] ScotCS CSOH_109 (22 August 2017)) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2017/[2017]_CSOH_109.html Cite as: [2017] ScotCS CSOH_109, [2017] CSOH 109

[1] The petitioner is a citizen of Pakistan who has three convictions for being concerned

in the supply of a controlled drug for which in each case he was sentenced to imprisonment

for periods of 4 years of more. The petitioner seeks reduction of a decision of the respondent

dated 16 August 2016 that submissions made on behalf of the petitioner on 16 May 2016 do

not meet the requirements of paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules and do not amount to

[2] The petitioner was born on 12 December 1967. At some time in 1978 he was granted

a Visa to join his father in this country and was granted indefinite leave to remain in line

with his father’s status. He has maintained his Pakistani Passport, having renewed it on at

least two occasions. He holds a valid Pakistan identity card which states his permanent

address as being in Islamabad, Pakistan. On 22 June 1988 the petitioner was convicted at

Chiltern Magistrates Court of handling stolen goods and fined £25. On 6 August 1990 he

was convicted at Rochdale Magistrates Court of aid & abet/obtaining property by deception

and fined £75. On 16 July 1997 he was convicted at Edinburgh Sheriff Court on two counts

of possession of a controlled drug and fined £100 for the first offence and £20 for the second

offence. On 22 August 2000 he was convicted at Edinburgh Sheriff Court of assault and

breach of the peace and fined £150. On 16 January 2002 he was convicted at Preston

Magistrates Court of possessing an offensive weapon in a public place and fined £50.

[3] On 22 April 2002 the petitioner was convicted at Edinburgh High Court of being

concerned in the supplying of controlled drugs and sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.

This was followed on 12 April 2005 when he was convicted at Edinburgh Sheriff Court of

being in charge of a motor vehicle whilst unfit, fined £400 and disqualified from driving for

[4] On 12 December 2005 the petitioner was convicted at Edinburgh High Court of being

concerned in the supplying of a controlled drug and sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. On

2 November 2010 he was convicted at Edinburgh Sheriff Court of being concerned in the

supplying of a controlled drug and sentenced to 32 months imprisonment. On 23 April 2013

he was convicted at Jedburgh Sheriff Court of being concerned in the supply of drugs and

[5] On 11 June 2013, the respondent served a deportation order, dated 7 June 2013, on

the petitioner. The petitioner appealed and the appeal was dismissed by the First-tier

Tribunal on 3 February 2014. Permission to appeal was refused both by the First-tier

[6] On 18 February 2016, the respondent undertook a review of the petitioner’s

deportation due to the passage of time since 2013. The respondent found there to be no

reason why the deportation order should not be enforced once his custodial sentence had

[7] The petitioner’s release date was 20 May 2016. On 27 April 2016 the respondent

advised the petitioner that it was her intention to remove him to Pakistan on 21 May 2016.

On 16 May 2016 the petitioner’s agents made further representations.

[8] In a decision letter dated 16 May 2016 the Secretary of State decided that the

submissions did not amount to a fresh claim. The petitioner brought Judicial Review

proceedings challenging the decision of 16 May, and that decision was subsequently

withdrawn by the respondent. The respondent issued a new decision letter dated 16 August

2016 which is a decision letter being challenged in the current proceedings. The decisions of

[9] Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides as

“117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of

imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a

qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a

qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of

imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless

there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a

court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the

extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the

Paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules, HC 395C provides as follows:

“When a human rights or protection claim has been refused or withdrawn or treated

as withdrawn under paragraph 333C of these Rules and any appeal relating to that

claim is no longer pending, the decision maker will consider any further submissions

and, if rejected, will then determine whether they amount to a fresh claim. The

submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different from the

material that has previously been considered. The submissions will only be

(ii) taken together with the previously considered material, created a realistic

prospect of success, notwithstanding its rejection. This paragraph does not

[10] The petitioner sought reduction of the letter of 16 August on the grounds that the

respondent had applied the wrong test, and esto she had applied the correct test her decision

[11] At the outset of the decision letter, the respondent set out the test as follows:

5. Consideration of further submissions is dealt with in Paragraph 353 of the

‘When a human rights or asylum claim has been refused or withdrawn or treated

as withdrawn under paragraph 333C of these Rules and any appeal relating to

that claim is no longer pending, the decision maker will consider any further

submissions and, if rejected, will then determine whether they amount to a fresh

claim. The submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly

different from the material that has previously been considered. The submissions

(ii) taken together with the previously considered material, created a

6. The correct approach to considering whether or not further submissions

amount to a fresh claim has been considered by the courts on many occasions.

‘The question is not whether the Secretary of State himself thinks that the new

claim is a good one of should succeed, but whether there is a realistic prospect of

an adjudicator, applying the rule of anxious scrutiny, thinking that the applicant

will be exposed to a real risk of persecution on return: see §7 above. The

Secretary of State of course can, and no doubt logically should, treat his own

view on the merits as a starting-point for that enquiry; but it is only a starting

point in the consideration of a question that is distinctly different for the exercise

of the Secretary of State making up his own mind. Second, in addressing that

question, both in respect of the evaluation of the facts and in respect of the legal

conclusions to be drawn from those facts, has the Secretary of State satisfied the

7. In addition, the Court of Appeal in YH (R on the application of) v SSHD

’15. WM (Congo) has been treated as authority that, in deciding whether to treat

a submission as a fresh claim, the Secretary of State should in effect put himself

in the shoes of an adjudicator or immigration Judge. The Judge quoted the

“The question is not whether the Secretary of State himself thinks that the

new claim is a good one or should succeed, but whether there is a realistic

prospect of an adjudicator [allowing the appeal]. The Secretary of State of

course can, and no doubt logically should, treat his own view of the merits as

a starting point for that enquiry; but that is only a starting point in the

consideration of a question that is distinctly different from the exercise of the

It was no doubt in deference to such guidance, that the decision-letter of 17th

April (see below) spoke of the view to be expected from “the hypothetical judge”.

16. The concept of a “hypothetical Judge” deciding an appeal can be a helpful

discipline, in so far as it makes clear that the Secretary of State is acting simply

as the gate-keeper to a process leading to a possible appeal, and it emphasises the

objectivity which that requires. However, it is no more than a guide, not a legal

formula. In law, whether under the rules or the statute, the Secretary of State is

standing in his or her own shoes in deciding this threshold question.’

8. It is also clear from the authorities on paragraph 353 that the test to surpass is

a modest one. On occasion it has been described as a case where there is

more than a fanciful prospect of success – seek AK (Sri Lanka)(R on the

9. It is against this background that your client’s further submissions have been

[12] Counsel for the petitioner took no exception to what was said in these paragraphs 5

to 9. He accepted, correctly, that this was a correct statement of the test. His argument was

that in her substantive treatment of the issues in paragraphs 40 and 41, the respondent had

40. As such it is concluded that your submissions do not meet the requirements

of paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules as stated above and therefore do

not amount to a fresh claim. This is because the new submissions, that he is a

reformed character who has overcome his habit of substance abuse and has

rekindled a relationship with his son and mother, taken together with the

previously considered material do not create a realistic prospect of success.

This means that it is not accepted that, should this material be considered by

an Immigration Judge, your client’s submissions would result in a decision to

grant your client Asylum, Humanitarian Protection, limited leave to remain

on the basis of his family or private life or any other form of leave for the

reasons set out above. While you have submitted new facts concerning the

relationship your client has with his son and to a lesser extent with the rest of

his family, these bring nothing substantially new to the argument. Your

client is being deported from the United Kingdom under the provisions of

section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007, a provision for automatic

deportation. The Secretary of State has a responsibility to deport foreign

national offenders. Your client’s rehabilitation so far is admirable as is his

claim to an improved relationship with his family, especially his son, but this

does not change the test applied. It is accepted that his family life may have

increased but not to a level where his removal would be a disproportionate

41. Notwithstanding this, and even if she were to accept your submissions at

their highest and she were minded to treat them as a fresh claim, the

Secretary of State does not accept that the presence of your client’s son or his

mother would be sufficient to overrule her responsibility to the public seeing

[14] In relation to paragraph 40, counsel took no exception to the sentence

“This is because the new submissions, that he is a reformed character who

has overcome his habit of substance abuse and has rekindled a relationship

with his son and mother, taken together with the previously considered

He accepted that this was a correct application of the test. The difficulty arose with the next

“This means that it is not accepted that, should this material be considered by an

Immigration Judge, your client’s submissions would result in a decision to grant

your client Asylum, Humanitarian Protection, limited leave to remain on the basis of

his family or private life or any other form of leave for the reasons set out above.”

He argued that that second sentence was a fundamental error: the test was not whether an

immigration judge would grant leave, but whether there was a realistic prospect of a judge

doing so. The respondent was stating that even if it were a fresh claim, that fresh claim

would not be sufficient to prevent deportation. This was a fundamental error as it did not

allow for a realistic prospect that an immigration judge would take a different view.

Paragraphs 5 to 8 could not cure the errors in paragraphs 40 and 41 because paragraphs 40

to 41 deserved primacy as they amounted to the respondent’s substantive reasoning, and

further they had been pasted wholesale into the document from the deficient earlier decision

[15] In response, counsel for the respondent submitted in relation to paragraph 40 that

reading the letter as a whole the correct test had been applied. She accepted that the

sentence beginning “This means that it is not accepted” could have been drafted better, and

it would have been better if it had said “submissions could result” rather than “would

result”. However the use of these words was not fatal. The wording used was a standard

form which appeared in many decision letters. The point had been taken in other petitions,

but no judge had ruled on it and, so far as she was aware, no other judge had the point at

avizandum. She further submitted that paragraph 41 did not form part of the

[16] In my opinion, the letter has to be considered on its own terms, and whether these

paragraphs also appeared in the previous decision, written by the same official and then

withdrawn, have no bearing on this. What matters is whether in this letter the Secretary of

[17] The wording in paragraph 40 the sentence beginning “this means that it is not

accepted that” is deficient. If that sentence were to be read in isolation, it is not a correct

interpretation of what the test means. It does not address whether the immigration judge

[18] However, that sentence is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read in the context

of the letter as a whole. Each case where this standard wording is used will turn on the

construction of the particular letter as a whole. There may be circumstances where

construction of the phrase “your client’s submissions would result” in the context of the

letter as a whole may constitute an application of the wrong test, but this is not one of them.

[19] In this letter, the correct test is clearly set out in paragraphs 5 to 9. Moreover, it is

clearly set out in the immediately preceding sentence in paragraph 40. Reading the letter as

a whole, it is clear that the respondent was well aware of the correct test and applied it: what

the respondent is saying is that the further submissions were so lacking in substantive merit

that there was no realistic prospect of a judge taking a different view. For the reasons set out

below, the respondent was entitled to take such a view on the substantive merits.

[20] With respect to paragraph 41, I accept counsel for the respondent’s submission that

this does not form part of the 353 consideration. Paragraph 41 proceeds on the hypothesis

that the 353 test has been satisfied and that the further submissions are a fresh claim.

Therefore it cannot logically form part of the decision as to whether the 353 test has been

[21] Accordingly I find that the respondent applied the correct test.

[22] At this stage it is helpful to set out in more detail the decision of the First-tier

Tribunal on 3 February 2014 and the submissions of 27 April 2016 which the petitioner

“53. Although the appellant states that he is not a serial criminal, based on the

evidence before us we find that that is exactly what he is. His crimes have not

been violent but they have been serious. He has spent over 10 years in prison

since he came to the United Kingdom when he was aged 11. He has always

been in the United Kingdom legally and was granted ILR in 1978 in line with

54. With regard to family life, it is debatable whether there is family life in this

case. The appellant refers to [A] as his ex-partner and the mother of his son.

She has given a statement but did not appear in court to support the

appellant's claim. The appellant is a drug addict and so is she. She states that

although she is still in a relationship with the appellant, he is always in

prison. She wants the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom so that he

can see his son but he has not seen his son for over a year. His ex-partner has

not visited him in prison and neither has his son. We believe that if there had

been a subsisting relationship [A] would have done her best to appear for the

55. The appellant has not seen his son for over a year. His sister's evidence is that

he gets on well with his son and they are happy when they are together but

they are very rarely together. Her evidence about this can be given little

weight as she has only seen the child 3 times since he was born 12 years ago.

56. This case is not in line with the said case of Maslov v Austria. Although the

appellant has a child he has little to do with him. He clearly thinks very little

of his child as he has continued to offend since his son was born and he was

in prison when he was born. Whether he has been in prison for 10 years or 15

years is not important. What is important is the gravity of his offences and the

fact that there is no period between the offences. He was still on licence when

he was convicted of his most recent offence. It can be said that there is family

life between this appellant and his son and perhaps between this appellant

and his ex-partner but it is extremely limited family life. Little weight can be

given to the relationships. [A’s] mother seems to have parental responsibility

for the appellant's son but the appellant was unable to give us any details of

this. He seems not to be interested in who his son is living with, in what

conditions he is living and whether this is a permanent arrangement and he

gave us no information about his son's schooling or the like because he does

not know anything about this. The deportation letter has little information

about this but it seems to have been almost impossible for the respondent to

57. Proportionality has to be assessed and the case of Razgar [2004] UK HL 27

has to be considered along with the 5 step process therein. This appellant's

private life case is stronger than his family life case. His mother is apparently

coming back to the United Kingdom. The appellant may go to stay with her if

he is released from prison and his sister states that he will be able to help her

and his mother but based on his history it is more likely that he will end up

back in prison. The appellant's mother could go to live with her other sons in

Islamabad. We have no evidence that she is coming back to the United

Kingdom. If she comes back the appellant's sister will look after her. We do

not believe that the appellant will be able to help. Although he states he has

been drug free for 13 months he has been in prison in a controlled

environment. When his history is considered there is nothing which makes us

believe he will be able to stop taking drugs or he will stop supplying drugs.

He will be returning to the city he lived in before and seeing the same people.

Although we do not have a social work report or a risk assessment, there

must be a high risk of him re-offending, based on the evidence we have

58. When proportionality is assessed we have noted that the appellant had his

primary education in Pakistan. Although his representative states that his

formative years have been spent in the United Kingdom he was in Pakistan

until he was 11 years old. It depends on what years you consider to be his

formative years. He came to the United Kingdom as a youth and has become

an adult here but he must remember his life in Pakistan. He speaks Urdu he

has 2 brothers and a sister in Pakistan and at present his mother is there. The

panel does not accept that this man has no links to Pakistan. He has strong

links there. If his mother stays there, he will have even stronger links.

59. With regard to the appellant's ex-partner, we know very little about her. She

states in her statement that she wishes the appellant to remain in the United

Kingdom but it is clear that when he is in the United Kingdom he has little

contact with her or with his child as he is always in prison. When the

appellant left school he worked for 6 years in a shop. If he returns to Pakistan

he can get a job there. He speaks Urdu and English. We do not find that there

is any reason why the appellant cannot return to Pakistan and continue with

his private life there. If he does this he will be away from the people who

might influence him relating to his drug addiction. We do not find that his

human rights will be breached if he is deported and we do not find that his

ex-partner's or his son's human rights will be breached if he is deported as it

would be in the public interest and for the public good for this man, who

continually breaks the law and supplies drugs to others, to return to Pakistan.

We have no real evidence of his private life in the UK. He is rarely out of

60. We have given weight to the appellant's sister's evidence and we have

considered her human rights. They are adult siblings and there is nothing

61. We have assessed whether an expulsion measure is necessary and is

proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Immigration Rules state that

it will be only be in exceptional circumstances that a person's right to family

and/ or private life would outweigh the public interest in seeing a person

deported, where they have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at

least 4 years. There are no exceptional circumstances. The appellant's offences

are mainly relating to the supply of a controlled drug but he has had

convictions for assault, theft, handling stolen goods and possession of an

offensive weapon. He has shown a consistent disregard for the laws of the

United Kingdom. His criminality has been escalating and there is a clear

propensity for him to re-offend. There is no evidence of any difficulty the

62. With regard to the delay by the Home Office, the nature of his offences means

63. This is a 2 stage decision and under Article 8 of ECHR we find it would be

conducive to the public good for this appellant to be deported. In assessing

proportionality, what the appellant has in his favour is the fact that he has

been in the UK for a long time. Against this, much of this time has been spent

in prison and there is no evidence to suggest that this will change apart from

the appellant stating that he is now drug free. This may have been the

situation before and he may then have lapsed. We have been given no

evidence about this. What we have are the facts and the appellant's many

convictions. We find that he has ties to Pakistan. He has siblings there and his

mother is there just now. He has a Pakistani passport and an up to date ID

card with a Pakistani address thereon. There is a family house and the

appellant speaks Urdu. There is a presumption in favour of deportation and

public interest will be served by deporting this appellant because of his

criminality. Because he has spent so much time in prison he has little or no

family life and a very limited private life. The balancing exercise must fall in

In paragraph 63 the First Tier Tribunal conducted a balancing exercise on proportionality.

In his further submissions of 16 May 2016 the petitioner is now seeking to have that

balancing exercise repeated with a different result because of two changes in circumstance

since 2014. The first change is that the petitioner is a reformed character due to his Muslim

religion: this would go to the finding in paragraphs 57 and 63 that there was no evidence

that his criminal lifestyle would change. The second change is that the petitioner now has a

closer relationship with his son: this would go to the findings in paragraphs 54 to 56 and 61

[24] The detail of these further submissions are set out in a letter from the petitioner’s

solicitors dated 16 May 2016 enclosing a number of supporting documents, including an

affidavit from the petitioner. The affidavit narrated that his circumstances relating to drugs

had changed and he was now in his fourth year toxic free; he had turned to prayer and led

Friday prayers in prison. The accompanying documents also included a letter dated

23 March 2016 from the Muslim chaplain at HMP Addiewell which referred to the petitioner

starting attending Islamic classes and then engaging in religious observation, and stating

that “I believe he has gone through significant personal development.” The documents also

included a parole report from Rev Bob Patterson, the faith services team leader at

“In discussions had over this time he has expressed his determination to no longer

engage in an un-Islamic life, resolving to exercise due diligence in redressing all of

his past lack in accordance with tenets of Islam. Both I and my Imam colleague

consider that he has been genuine in these endeavours and has indeed succeeded in

[25] In an email to the petitioner’s instructing agents dated 19 February 2016 Mr Patterson

stated “throughout his time here he has remained unswervingly engaged with living

“In conclusion, knowing so much of [the petitioner’s] wrong and extensive

engagement in criminal activity, I can say without any sense of misgiving that he has

achieved enduring authenticity of a changed life as the foregoing factors evidence, I

[26] With regard to the petitioner’s son, the petitioner stated in his affidavit that he has

been able to obtain a DNA report to confirm that he is the father, and that his son visits him

regularly and he sees him every five weeks and speaks to him once or twice per week.

[27] In the decision letter of 16 August 2016, the respondent dealt with the further

“27. In the original decision letter of 11 June 2013 your client’s Article 8 rights were

considered. It was clear that, because of the length of his custodial sentence

which exceeds the period set out in paragraph 398(a) of the Immigration Rules,

the public interest in him being deported would only be overridden in very

compelling circumstances over and above those described in the exceptions to

28. The exceptions described in paragraphs 399 and 399A deal mainly with the

relationships your client may have had with family members, be they children or

partners. They also deal with the time he may have spent in the United Kingdom

prior to the decision to deport him was made. It is clear therefore that the very

compelling circumstances would have to be over and above any family life he

may have had or has enjoyed since being served with the deportation order.

29. However, and for the avoidance of doubt, the Secretary of State has considered

whether or not your client’s family life amount to a very compelling

30. As stated in our letter of 11 June 2013, there is significant public interest in

 He has been convicted of being concerned in the supply of a controlled

drug for which he received a sentence of over 4 years imprisonment ;

 His removal is in accordance with the permissible aim of the prevention

of disorder and crime and the protection of the rights and freedom of

 The Secretary of State is required to make a deportation order on foreign

criminals where there has been a sentence of imprisonment for a single

31. In order to outweigh the very significant public interest in deporting your client,

he would need to provide evidence of a very strong Article 8 claim over and

above the circumstances described in the exceptions to deportation.

32. Your client’s Article 8 claim is based on his relationship with his son. The child’s

33. The Home Office’s duty to safeguard the welfare of children as set out in section

55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 has been taken into

account and the best interests of your client’s child has been a primary

consideration in making the deportation and human rights decision. However,

the best interests of the child are not the only or paramount consideration, and

must be balanced against other relevant factors, including the public interest in

deporting foreign criminals, to determine whether your client’s deportation is

34. As stated above, the best interest of your client’s child has been considered

previously. It is understood that he is living with his grandmother in Edinburgh.

Your client has been absent from his son’s life for a significant amount of time

following his convictions for drugs offences and subsequent custodial sentences.

It is considered, following these convictions at least, that the child’s grandmother

is the child’s primary carer. The claimed rekindling of your client and his son’s

relationship following his latest conviction is admirable but is only a recent

manifestation after years of separation. It is clear from your submissions that

your client’s involvement in his child’s life is limited to weekly calls and

35. The Secretary of State considers that after your client is removed from the United

Kingdom, he will be able to maintain contact with his son by modern means of

communication such as instant messaging or Skype. Indeed the child himself

could travel to Pakistan to visit your client should he wish to do so. The child

could apply for a visa to travel to Pakistan (or his Grandmother could apply on

his behalf). The Secretary of State is aware that children travel all over the world

on an unaccompanied basis if no appropriate adult can be found to travel with

them. It is not accepted that this separation from your client, caused by his own

actions when he was convicted of serious drugs offences, outweighs the child’s

Article 8 rights even when taken as a primary consideration. It is submitted that

it is entirely up to the child’s parents or carers whether contact should be

maintained between the child and his father. There is nothing to suggest that the

child’s upbringing would be adversely affected or be disadvantaged by living in

36. By the same token, the child is of an age where relocating to a different country

would not be considered too harsh. He is of an age where relocation would not

be considered a major impediment in his development as a child. The decision

on whether or not he should join your client would of course be solely down to

37. It is accepted that the best interests of the child are undoubtedly that your client

should remain in the United Kingdom however, the Secretary of State has to

balance that interest against the interest of society in general, in that he be

deported as he is a foreign national who has committed crimes that represent a

serious threat to the safety of the public. It is submitted that the presence of your

client’s child in the United Kingdom does not amount to a very compelling

circumstance that would outweigh the public interest in your client’s

38. In addition, your client has claimed that he now wishes to look after his mother

as she is getting old. However it is clear from previous communications that his

mother has been living in Rochdale with her daughter and does not require her

son to look after her. Your client’s mother appears to travel between Pakistan

and the United Kingdom, living in the family home in Islamabad when she is

there. During the appeal hearing in 2012 your client stated that he had brothers

and sisters who still lived in Pakistan although they were estranged at that time.

Notwithstanding this, the Secretary of State considers that your client’s

relationship with his mother at best is nothing beyond normal familial ties with

his family and his removal would not engage a breach of Article 8. Even with his

mother here in the United Kingdom your client can be returned to Pakistan. He

claims to be recovering from his addiction so there is nothing to stop him seeking

employment or establishing himself in Pakistan even without the direct support

39. Given all of the above, the Secretary of State submits that the relationship your

client now claims to have with his son or his own mother is insufficient for her to

[28] Counsel for the petitioner argued that esto the respondent had applied the correct

test, her decision was irrational and failed to demonstrate anxious scrutiny.

[29] The petitioner argued that the respondent had acted irrationally in conducting the

balancing exercise between the public interest and the prevention of disorder or crime, and

the private interest of the petitioner and his son in their private and family life. The

respondent did not engage with the evidence about the petitioner’s rehabilitation, nor

attempt to evaluate his risk of reoffending in the light of his religious conversion. Due to the

abundance of credible evidence of rehabilitation and religious conversion, the only rational

conclusion available to the respondent was that a First-tier Tribunal judge could form the

view that the risk of reoffending was low, which would significantly reduce the public

interest in deportation. Counsel referred to HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home

Department [2016] 1 WLR 4799 at paragraphs 25, 36, 51 – 53, 62 – 63, 26, 46, 25 and Maslov v

Austria [2009] INLR 47 at 68 – 75. In relation to private interest, the respondent recognised

that the best interests of the child were “undoubtedly” to have the petitioner remain in the

United Kingdom, but asserted that those interests were outweighed by the public interest.

The respondent erred in failing to give adequate reasons in relation to the best interests of

the petitioner’s son, which was a primary consideration in the case, failing to carefully

examine all the relevant factors relating to the child’s best interests, failing to form a clear

idea of the child’s circumstances before she asked herself whether those interests were

outweighed by other considerations and for failing to have regard to the fact that relocation

would likely separate the child from his primary carer. The respondent also left out of

account that the petitioner’s son’s mother was a drug addict and unable to care for him. The

respondent held that it was undoubtedly in the best interests of the petitioner’s son for him

to stay (paragraph 37 of the decision letter) and accordingly there required to be strong

countervailing factors to overcome his interest. The respondent was bound to conclude that

a judge of the First-tier Tribunal could accept the evidence that the petitioner had radically

reformed, and having done so that the weight of public interest diminished considerably,

and consider that the Article 8 rights of the petitioner and the best interests of the child,

prevailed over the public interest. She was accordingly bound to accept that the

submissions amounted to a fresh claim. In any event, she failed to demonstrate anxious

scrutiny ie that no material factor that could conceivably be regarded as favourable to the

petitioner was left out of account in the review of the evidence. He referred to ZH Tanzania

v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4 at 45 – 47, Beoku-Betts v SSHD [2009] 1 AC 115 at paragraphs 5

[30] In response, counsel for the respondent referred to section 117C of the Nationality,

Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and submitted under reference to HA Iraq at

paragraph 50 that only a claim which was very strong indeed would succeed, and that this

was not such a claim. The evidence about his rehabilitation was only one factor to take into

account and other evidence such as his long record of serious offending and the fact that his

drug free period had not been tested by being outside prison were not sufficient to alter the

balance to such an extent that it swung in favour of the petitioner

[31] The question for this court is not whether there is a realistic prospect of success in an

appeal before an immigration judge but whether the Secretary of State was Wednesbury

unreasonable or acted without anxious scrutiny in reaching the view that there was not (R v

[32] Section 117(c) provides that where a foreign criminal has been sentenced to a period

of imprisonment for at least 4 years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are

very compelling circumstances. In this case, the petitioner has been sentenced to

[33] The Tribunal is required to carry out a balancing exercise to decide if the deportation

“50. In summary, therefore, the tribunal carries out its task on the basis of the facts as

it finds them to be on the evidence before it, and the law as established by statute

and case law. Ultimately, it has to decide whether deportation is proportionate in the

particular case before it, balancing the strength of the public interest in the

deportation of the offender against the impact on private and family life. In doing so,

it should give appropriate weight to Parliament’s and the Secretary of State’s

assessments of the strength of the general public interest in the deportation of foreign

offenders, as explained in paras 14, 37-38 and 46 above, and also consider all factors

relevant to the specific case in question. The critical issue for the tribunal will

generally be whether, giving due weight to the strength of the public interest in the

deportation of the offender in the case before it, the article 8 claim is sufficiently

strong to outweigh it. In general, only a claim which is very strong indeed - very

[34] The original Tribunal decision of 2014 found that there was no such very strong or

compelling claim: there was family life between the petitioner and his son but that this was

extremely limited, the petitioner was in prison when his son was born in 2002 and had spent

most of his son’s life in prison and was not interested in his son’s living arrangements, nor

did he have any knowledge of the son’s schooling or the like. The further submissions were

to the effect that this had now changed in that the son visited and spoke to him in prison on

a regular basis. In the decision letter, the respondent commends the petitioner for his

improved relationship with his family, especially his son, calling it admirable. However,

while accepting that his family life may have increased, she takes the view that this has not

increased to the level where his removal would be a disproportionate breach of Article 8 and

[35] In my opinion the respondent was entitled to find that the additional information

given in the petitioner’s further submissions about his improved relationship with his son

does not lift his article 8 claim into the category of being “very compelling circumstances”

within section 117. He has been in prison for most of his son’s life and has taken no interest

in him until some recent point after the 2014 decision, and that recent interest has been of a

limited nature due to his imprisonment. In these circumstances in my opinion the

respondent did not act unreasonably or without anxious scrutiny in finding that the further

submissions in respect of family life have no realistic prospect of success.

[36] I now turn to the further submissions in respect of the risk of re-offending. In

paragraph 57 of its decision of 3 February 2014, the First-tier Tribunal took the view, on the

evidence it had before it, that there must be a high risk of the petitioner reoffending. It came

to this view on the basis that although he had been drug free for 13 months he had been in

prison and not in the outside world; there was nothing in his history which made them

believe he would be able to stop taking drugs or would stop supplying drugs; he would be

returning to the city he lived in before and seeing the same people. The petitioner sought to

address this by providing evidence that he was now going into his fourth year free of drugs,

and that as a result of turning to religion he was now a reformed character. That evidence

was considered by the Secretary of State in the letter of 16 August 2016. In respect of him

being drug free, the Secretary of State stated that “While being toxin free for approximately

3 years is admirable, the Secretary of State is aware that this situation only occurred while

your client was in custody” (paragraph 26). In paragraph 40, the Secretary of State stated

“Your client’s rehabilitation so far is admirable”. The respondent recognised the

improvement which the petitioner had made to his life, but did not find that these

improvements could overcome these findings of the First-tier Tribunal.

[37] In my opinion, the Secretary of State was entitled to come to that conclusion and did

not act unreasonably or without anxious scrutiny in doing so. It remained the case, as it had

done before the First-tier Tribunal, that the petitioner’s ability to remain drug free and not

indulge in crime had not been tested outwith the prison environment. While there was

nothing to suggest that his new attitude towards religion was a sham, that was not in itself

sufficient to overcome the problem identified by the First-tier Tribunal. The Tribunal held in

paragraph 57 that there was a high risk of re-offending. The further submissions did not

contain any sort of risk assessment as to his re-offending. The chaplains’ reports were not an

assessment of the risk of offending. A new tribunal judge looking at the further submissions

would require to consider the question of the risk of reoffending in the round, taking into

account not only the petitioner’s new religious and drug-free lifestyle within the prison

environment but also other factors such as his extensive criminal record and his previous

lifestyle in the community. The Secretary of State gave careful consideration to this and

came to a reasoned view on it. She took the view that, when taken together with what was

said in the 2014 Tribunal decision, the chaplains’ reports would not create a realistic

prospect of success before a tribunal judge. In my opinion she was entitled to do so.

[38] In these circumstances in my opinion the respondent was entitled to come to the

view which she did, and in so doing did not act irrationally, nor without anxious scrutiny.

[39] For these reasons, the petition is refused. I reserve all questions of expenses in the

Scottish Court of Session Decisions